The Letters Of Telios De Lorca

The Letters Of Telios De Lorca – Which so far shows that “being so convertible with intelligibility is such an important idea for Platonic thought [that] disappeared with the rise of nominalism” (as a friend who understands it better said).

Despite the differences in expression, the structure of participation, implying both transcendence and immanence, remains the same in Plato, Plotinus, Proclus, and Dionysius: one and the same term is present in many different things and as that which is the same in all. of them (immanent), is other than and unconditioned by all of them (transcendent). But if all the determinations of all things are the presence of God in them, then God is not merely “in all things,” as if he were in something other than himself. Rather, God is the entire content of reality, “all in all things.” God “is all things as the cause of all things, and holds together and stores in himself all the principles, all the limits of all beings.” The various features, characters, or natures, the determinations found in a thing, constitute the whole intelligible content of that thing, all that is in it for the mind to encounter. And since to be is to be intelligible, things themselves form the whole. A being can be nothing but the sum total of its intelligible determinations, down to the smallest details, which is this particular thing and no other. The divine processions are therefore “in” all things, not as contained in anything other than themselves, but as constituting their entire content. God is the “cause” of all things and is therefore subject to all names, for the whole intelligible content of all things, and thus the whole of reality, is nothing but the distinguished presence of God.

The Letters Of Telios De Lorca

God is “the illumination of the illumined, and the principle of perfection of the perfect, and the principle of deification of the deified, and the simplicity of the simplified, and the unity of the united… and, simply put, the life of living things and the being of beings.” He is present to all beings as a being, a universal character common to all beings in that they are beings: God “neither was, nor will be, nor will be, will not be, nor will be; rather it is not. But he is being.” Similarly, he is present to all living things as life, the universal determination which is living things as opposed to inanimate things. But the determining, constitutive divine presence is not limited to such sublime attributes as being and life, but includes all the features of each thing which constitute it as that distinct thing, as itself, and therefore as a being. …Here these ‘paradigms’ or logoi contained indiscriminately in God are expressly designated as the defining or determining principles which make beings to be. God is thus present in every being as its determining or defining logos, which it is itself and so it is. All the features of all things are therefore God—in them—and makes them by making them what they are, so that God is not merely being in beings and life in living things, but “all things in all things.” This constitutive presence of God in all things is what Dionysius variously calls “powers,” “participations,” “processes,” “providences,” “manifestations,” or “ distribution” of God. All these expressions o they point to God’s causal presence.

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To summarize the opening comments before my transcript gets going: Christianity is not an intellectual pursuit, and being a Platonist certainly does not have to be a Christian. Louth makes it clear that he is not promoting Christian Platonism, nor is he interested in any such intellectual camps as if we had to decide between alternatives such as “Christian Platonism” or “Christian Aristotelianism” or “Christian existentialism”. Finally, Louth makes it clear that he does not see Aristotle as fundamentally at odds with Plato, but as part of the Platonic tradition. Louth argues that as we trace the intellectual work of Christian theology, we find that Platonism provided the necessary background or framework—one that uniquely enabled Christian thinkers to articulate the centrality of Christ in a way that preserves the mystery of Christ from being. sucked into transcendence or drawn into immediacy.

18:37 There is no doubt that among the fathers Plato may have been highly honored. Saint Athanasius [d. 373] …refers to Plato as “great among the Greeks” (albeit in connection with attributing to him the false doctrine of creation from pre-existing matter). In the Questions and Answers of St. Anastasia of Sinai [7. century] we find this story. There is an ancient tradition that a certain learned man often used to curse Plato, the philosopher. Plato appeared to him in his sleep and said to him: “Man, stop cursing me, for you are only harming yourself. I was a sinful person for that, I don’t deny that. When Christ descended into Hades, no one really believed in him before I did.” Plato was then held in some respect among all the fathers, at least in Late Antiquity. At the end of the first millennium, respect for Plato was more conflicted. Among the anathemas added to the Synodikon of Orthodoxy after the condemnation of John Itala in 1082 an anathema was pronounced on those who “followed Hellenic learning”—among whom no doubt Plato was included—”and are formed by it not only as an educational discipline, but who follow their empty opinions and believe them to be true.” Aristotle himself had less attraction for his father. St. Gregory the Theologian, in a famous phrase often quoted by others, advised Christians to present their theology…after the manner of the fisherman (apostles), not after the manner of Aristotle. [This] joke that Saint John Damascene completed. Writing against John Philoponus, he noted that Philoponus’ problems, both trinitarian and Christological, would not have arisen if he had not cited St. Aristotle as the thirteenth apostle. In both of these cases, Aristotle seems to have been referring to his logical works, which were in fact already embedded in a fundamentally Platonic context. …Christian Platonism strikes me as a category error. …The idea of ​​Christian Platonism …sees these positions—Christianity, Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and so on—as a set of doctrines. However, recent scholarship has found a much more adequate understanding of what was meant by philosophy in Late Antiquity, insisting that such philosophies were not simply a matter of doctrines, even though they included doctrines and philosophers argued about them among themselves, but were primarily (to use part of the title of the book containing the English translations of the most prominent scholar holding this view, namely Pierre Hadot) as “a way of life”. In this sense, Christianity could certainly be considered and sometimes presented as a philosophical school. But talking about Christian Platonism muddies the waters. This is especially evident since Mark Edwards published his book with the provocative title Origen against Plato, in which Origen is presented not as a Christian Platonist (as he often was), but as an explicit critic of Plato. The various philosophical schools of late antiquity could and did overlap in the doctrines they espoused, but it was also quite clear what set them apart. It was where they found their authority for the doctrines they held: the dialogues of Plato, the writings of Aristotle, the Christian scriptures. In late antiquity, in reaction against Christian and Jewish appeals to their ancient scriptures, we find philosophical schools of a general Platonic color, appealing to the authority of supposed ancient oracles, such as the Chaldean oracles or the treatises attributed to the thrice-greatest Hermes (Hermes Trismegistos), oracles of which it claimed to be the ultimate source of Plato’s doctrines, something Plato did not discourage in his own appeal in the Symposium to the teachings of Diotima, priestess of Manitea. The term Christian Platonism confuses the issue and suggests that Christianity is, as it were, an adjective to Platonism, whereas the opposite was the case for all those who claimed to be Christian Platonists. They supported their doctrines by appealing to the scriptures, so they could at best be considered Platonic Christians. The only late antique thinker I can think of who could reasonably be considered a Christian Platonist was Synesius of Cyrene, a Platonist and Neo-Platonist who became a Christian, indeed Bishop Christina, but made it clear in a letter to his brother that the truth was something he had learned from Plato, while what he had to preach as a Christian bishop was nothing but popular myths to him. But Synesius is quite a rare case. …So I am not advocating Christian Platonism. What might seem more fruitful might be to point out the doctrinal overlap between Christianity and Platonism. There is indeed and significant overlap in the doctrines accepted by Platonists and Christians. Both believed in the existence of divinity (God or gods), in divine providence (God’s care of